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INTRODUCTION 
Much ink has been spilled over the class action device.  Commentators 
have thoroughly analyzed both the plain language and intent behind the 
federal rules authorizing the aggregation of claims in a single lawsuit as 
well as the policy implications of the class action in both theory and prac-
tice.  Seldom does a work break new ground in a field that has been plowed 
as often as that of class actions.  Martin Redish‘s Wholesale Justice: Consti-
tutional Democracy and the Problem of the Class Action Lawsuit is the rare 
exception. 
In Wholesale Justice, Professor Redish provides a thorough analysis of 
the constitutional implications of the class action mechanism.  Unlike prior 
commentators and courts, which have focused mainly on limited constitu-
tional issues arising in class action cases, Professor Redish‘s analysis 
sweeps more broadly.  In the process, he brings to bear principles of consti-
tutional law that have long lain dormant in the field of class action practice.  
His insights demonstrate that more than mere practical or policy concerns 
arise when class action procedures are used.  Rather, they implicate—and 
often infringe—fundamental principles of constitutional law. 
Part I of this review discusses Professor Redish‘s thesis that the class 
action procedure as applied today is profoundly troubling from a constitu-
tional perspective.  Professor Redish observes that class action procedures 
under Rule 23 often infringe the due process right to individual autonomy 
by sweeping large numbers of individuals into litigation—either through 
mandatory class action procedures under Rule 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) or 
through the opt-out procedure embodied in Rule 23(b)(3)without explicit 
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long recognized the plaintiff‘s fundamental right under the Due Process 
Clauses both to choose whether and how to bring litigation and to control 
its direction.  Professor Redish argues that these constitutional concerns are 
compounded by the fact that the class action procedure effectively changes 
substantive law by allowing the pursuit of claims that otherwise would not 
be pursued as individual actions.  This, in turn, raises profound separation 
of powers and federalism concerns, which Congress itself acknowledged in 
the Rules Enabling Act.1 
Part II discusses proposals for reform that Professor Redish believes 
will help mitigate some of these constitutional concerns.  First, Professor 
Redish argues that courts should be required to scrutinize proposed class ac-
tions to weed out so-called ―faux‖ class action cases—i.e., cases in which 
individual class members are unlikely to receive significant compensation 
and only plaintiffs‘ counsel stand to benefit from class certification.  Ac-
cording to Professor Redish, such cases represent a significant infringement 
on the right to individual autonomy, and therefore warrant mandatory scru-
tiny under Rule 23 rather than the discretionary scrutiny currently autho-
rized under the Rule.  Second, Professor Redish argues that the opt-out 
mechanism under Rule 23(b)(3) should be abandoned in favor of an opt-in 
mechanism that requires absent class members to take some affirmative ac-
tion before being swept into a class action.  Redish argues that allowing due 
process rights to be waived simply by inaction, as under the current version 
of the rule, does not sufficiently protect such constitutional rights.  Finally, 
Professor Redish offers additional criticisms of settlement class actions.  
Professor Redish argues that such classes are inherently flawed because 
they lack the ―case‖ or ―controversy‖ necessary to confer federal jurisdic-
tion under Article III. 
Part III discusses other ways in which Professor Redish‘s theories may 
be applied in practice or in which the constitutional concerns he identifies 
may already be recognized, at least implicitly.  As Professor Redish ac-
knowledges, the Supreme Court has recognized the due process right to au-
tonomy on occasion, including in its decision rejecting class certification in 
Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corporation.2  There, the Court expressly invoked the 
autonomy interest Professor Redish discusses to constrain the application of 
Rule 23(b)(1)(B).3  The constitutional concerns Professor Redish raises, 
moreover, may have implicitly influenced courts in imposing other limita-
tions on the use of the class action device, including in certain categories of 
class action cases, such as nationwide class actions, or mass tort and prod-
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er judicial recognition of the constitutional concerns Professor Redish iden-
tifies. 
Finally, Part IV offers a brief conclusion.  Professor Redish‘s book is 
likely to provide ample ground for further academic study of the class ac-
tion device as well as give policymakers and courts grounds for questioning 
the current application of these procedures.  Indeed, his book has appeal for 
a much broader audience: members of the public who recognize that there is 
something wrong in our modern civil litigation system, but are unsure as to 
the precise source of such problems.  The denial of fundamental due 
process rights Professor Redish identifies and, in turn, the erosion of demo-
cratic values in the application of the class action device is one aspect of our 
judicial system deserving of such public scrutiny. 
I. PROFESSOR REDISH‘S THESIS 
As Professor Redish observes, there are many reasons to be concerned 
with the class action procedure as a matter of policy.  For one thing, a class 
action may prejudice the interests of absent class members.  If a class is cer-
tified and the class representatives are unsuccessful, the absent class mem-
bers‘ claims will be ―legally obliterated‖ by the result of the litigation, even 
though they did not actively participate in the suit.4  Likewise, as many have 
observed,5 a class action can reduce the input any particular plaintiff has in 
the conduct of the case.  Where thousands are represented in a single law-
suit, it is simply impossible for them to have the same level of input regard-
ing the prosecution of their claims.  Moreover, conflicts among class 
members inevitably emerge, rendering the class action mechanism an im-
perfect means of resolving large-scale litigation. 
The potential downside of the class action procedure for defendants is 
also significant.  Certification of a class may bring pressure to settle weak 
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The risk associated with bringing the case to trial is increased commensura-
bly when a class is certified: ―Aggregation of claims . . . makes it more like-
ly that a defendant will be found liable and results in significantly higher 
damage awards.‖8  Furthermore, the ability to defend against weak claims is 
reduced where weaker claims are aggregated with claims of greater merit.  
As Professor Redish observes, these dynamics can often lead to a situation 
where the class action is ―employed as a form of legalized blackmail, by 
which an unscrupulous group of plaintiffs‘ attorneys effectively extort 
money from large companies by threatening their very existence with busi-
ness-crushing class awards.‖9 
In the settlement context, the class action device may have equally 
perverse effects.  Settlements may be the result of collusive deals among the 
defendants and certain plaintiffs, designed to achieve peace for defendants 
while extracting fees for the plaintiffs‘ attorneys.  Such agreements poten-
tially prejudice the interests of the class as a whole or at least those of cer-
tain class members.10  These practical dangers of the settlement class are 
well-known and were fully explored in the Supreme Court‘s twin decisions 
in Amchem and Ortiz.  There, the Court examined in detail the potential 
conflicts that may emerge among different groups of plaintiffs and their 
lawyers in the context of mass tort settlement classes and ultimately held 
that the classes under review could not be certified.11 
Professor Redish‘s contribution to this debate is his recognition that the 
concerns with the class action device are not merely prudential.  Rather, 
there are profound constitutional concerns with the use of class actions that 
have gone largely unaddressed by both courts and commentators.12  Profes-
sor Redish sets out to examine ―the class action device from the broader 
perspectives of constitutional [and] political theory.‖13  In the process, he 
identifies a number of fundamental constitutional concerns that have re-
ceived comparatively little attention in the debate over class action proce-
dure. 
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Most significantly, Professor Redish notes that the class action device, 
by its very nature, divests individual plaintiffs ―either legally or practically‖ 
of their right to control the vindication of other rights through the legal 
process.14  Indeed, as he observes, in situations where the claims of each 
class member are small, ―[m]any class members are likely not even aware 
that they are plaintiffs in a major legal action, and the overwhelming major-
ity will never even benefit directly from a successful prosecution.‖15  He ar-
gues that this violates ―the theoretical foundation of the procedural due 
process guarantee: the individual litigant‘s autonomy in deciding whether to 
pursue her claim and if so, how best to conduct that litigation.‖16 
At the same time, Professor Redish notes that the class action device, 
while purportedly purely procedural, often has the practical effect of mak-
ing significant alterations in substantive law.17  One way in which class ac-
tions essentially alter substantive rules is by effectively requiring absent 
class members to bring claims against a defendant.18  Under traditional no-
tions of substantive law, the choice as to whether to bring a claim is solely 
that of the plaintiff,19 who is ―master of the complaint.‖20  In class actions, 
however, if a non-opt-out class is certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or 23(b)(2), 
absent class members are compelled to bring their claims as part of the liti-
gation.21  Likewise, even in opt-out classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3), 
there is an element of coercion given that inertia may lead absent class 
members to refrain from taking action to affirmatively opt-out of a class.22  
As a result, ―what purports to be a class action, brought primarily to enforce 
private individuals‘ substantive rights to compensatory relief, in reality 
amounts to little more than private attorneys acting as bounty hunters, pro-
tecting the public interest by enforcing the public policies embodied in con-
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the underlying substantive law by use of the supposedly neutral class action 
device is completely indefensible as a matter of democratic theory.‖24   
Professor Redish finds this aspect of class action procedure particularly 
troubling given that it has been authorized by committee, outside the legis-
lative process.25  Under the Rules Enabling Act (which provides authority 
for the promulgation of Rule 23), an advisory committee is charged with fa-
shioning the rules governing procedure in the federal courts.26  While the 
Act expressly dictates that the rules make no change to the substantive 
law,27 in practice Professor Redish believes that Rule 23 in fact violates this 
command as properly construed.  He lays out an argument suggesting ―the 
possibility that the Rules Enabling Act—at least as currently imple-
mented—should be found unconstitutional,‖ or that at a minimum, the 
courts should construe the act as requiring that certain procedural 
changes—those effecting important policy changes—be reserved to Con-
gress.28 
Professor Redish argues that these constitutional problems result from 
Rule 23‘s deviation from the traditional conception of aggregate litigation, 
which was characterized by ―substantively cohesive and interconnected 
groups.‖29  It was only in the context of ―group-held rights‖ that such repre-
sentative procedures traditionally were employed, and only in that context 
that they could have potential res judicata effect.30  Thus, for example, the 
cases in which such procedural mechanisms historically were employed 
tended to involve ―pre-litigation groups and cases involving separate claims 
into a common fund.‖31  The device was not originally envisioned as en-
compassing situations in which what are essentially individual claims are 
bundled as a result of the litigation process. 
Professor Redish faults the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 as liberalizing 
the use of aggregative methods in a way that abridges individual rights of 
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Rule 23 as amended in 1966, the class action device may be used to aggre-
gate claims that are individual in nature.  The most obvious example of this 
aspect of the Rule is found in subsection (b)(3), which expressly authorizes 
courts to group together individual claims that may have a number of indi-
vidual differences so long as common issues ―predominate‖ and the class 
action device is a ―superior‖ method for resolving the litigation.33  However, 
Professor Redish argues that subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) also sweep up in-
dividualized claims that are ―linked by nothing more than substantive paral-
lelism or procedural fortuity‖ and may at times actually be at odds with 
each other ―as where claims exceed the limited funds available‖ in a 
(b)(1)(B) class.34 
Professor Redish argues that drafters of the 1966 amendments did not 
fully consider the constitutional ramifications of these changes.35  ―Once the 
class action procedure was altered to permit—indeed, on occasion even re-
quire—the group adjudication of purely individually held rights, the stakes 
for both the political theory of liberal democracy and the constitutional 
theory of procedural due process were correspondingly altered in funda-
mental ways.‖36  Moreover, he notes that since the revisions to Rule 23, the 
courts have remained relatively silent on the issue, only occasionally noting 
the tension between the class action procedure and the Constitution‘s guar-
antee of due process.37  Accordingly, in Professor Redish‘s view, we have 
reached a state in which fundamental constitutional rights have been signif-
icantly eroded under the radar, so to speak.  Innovation that had no real ba-
sis in historical precedent coupled with neglect from courts and 
commentators has resulted in an unrealized loss of liberty that affects nearly 
all citizens in some way. 
II. PROFESSOR REDISH‘S SPECIFIC PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 
In order to address these unrecognized constitutional problems, Profes-
sor Redish offers some proposals for further limitations on the class action 
device.  Arguing that the misuse of Rule 23 has led to a fundamental altera-
tion of substantive law and the violation of democratic principles, he sug-
gests that ―substantial‖ modifications of Rule 23 are warranted to prevent 
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A. Limiting “Faux” Class Actions 
One of Professor Redish‘s proposals is directed at class actions that 
benefit lawyers but not the actual class members who ultimately receive lit-
tle or no compensation—what he calls ―faux‖ class actions.39  Professor Re-
dish criticizes such actions on the ground that they effectively represent a 
transformation of the substantive law under Rule 23: ―As a result of the 
class action procedure, what purports to be a substantive compensatory 
framework has been furtively transformed into a structure in which it is 
quite possible that virtually no victim receives compensation through en-
forcement of the underlying substantive law.‖40  While he acknowledges 
that such a suit may ―further the public interest‖ if it ―exposes, punishes, 
and deters illegal corporate behavior,‖41 he nonetheless finds that such suits 
violate fundamental constitutional rights. 
Professor Redish suggests requiring courts to undertake an analysis to 
determine whether ―it is reasonable to predict that meaningful compensato-
ry relief to individual class members would result from successful prosecu-
tion of the class proceeding.‖42  As he notes, there is presently nothing in 
Rule 23 prohibiting such an analysis.  However, he believes that it would be 
wise to require courts to undertake such an analysis to ―avoid[] transform-
ing a class action into a bounty hunter action.‖43  Along the same lines, he 
suggests that ―an amendment to Rule 23 dictating that attorneys‘ fees be 
measured by reference to the value of the total number of class member 
claims actually filed, rather than by the total amount of settlement or poten-
tial claims, would go far toward deterring pure bounty hunter class ac-
tions.‖44 
Such proposals for reform go against the recommendations of many 
academic commentators, who argue that one of the primary benefits of the 
class action is that it facilitates litigation that otherwise would not be 
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nomically feasible to bring individual lawsuits.45  Such ―negative value‖ 
claims may be feasible only when grouped in a class action, where the 
overhead of bringing the lawsuit is shared among all class members.  Even 
if the class members do not ultimately receive much in the way of compen-
sation, such lawsuits can have value in deterring conduct that is harmful to 
society, or at least that is what some commentators argue.  Professor Re-
dish, however, maintains that the constitutional concerns with such suits 
plainly outweigh any pragmatic arguments.  Even if there were always 
some societal value in such suits (which he disputes), they cannot be 
brought at the expense of fundamental individual rights. 
B. Establishing Class Membership Through An Opt-In Procedure 
Professor Redish suggests replacing the opt-out procedure embodied in 
Rule 23(b)(3) with an opt-in procedure for similar reasons.46  Under the 
proposed opt-in procedure, putative members of a class would have to take 
some affirmative action to join the litigation.47  This reform would eliminate 
the possibility that plaintiffs could be included in a class based on nothing 
more than inertia.48  As Professor Redish notes, excusing oneself from a 
class is not worth the effort in many instances.49  Moreover, despite re-
quirements regarding the notice that must be given to absent class members, 
there is always the possibility that many class members will not receive no-
tice of the litigation or that such notice will be insufficient to fully inform 
them of their rights, thereby depriving them of any meaningful opportunity 
to opt-out.   
Indeed, Professor Redish suggests that the 1966 amendments to Rule 
23 may have been purposefully ―designed to subvert the essential remedial 
structure of the governing substantive law‖ by facilitating class actions in 
cases where consumers would not take action to litigate themselves.50  Pro-
fessor Redish notes that ―the Committee apparently had in mind small-
claim, consumer class actions in which no one class member would have a 
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50
  Id. at 41. 
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inertia might be greater than a potential class member‘s desire to partici-
pate, given the small stakes involved.‖51 
However, as Professor Redish observes, there are constitutional con-
cerns with allowing fundamental due process rights to be waived in such a 
cavalier fashion.52  Generally a waiver of constitutional rights requires some 
affirmative action on the part of an individual holding such rights.53  How-
ever, the opt-out procedure allows waiver through inaction under circums-
tances in which inaction is highly likelygiven that the effort it takes to 
affirmatively opt-out is outweighed by the marginal benefits of simply 
doing nothing.  
C. Abolishing Settlement Classes 
Finally, Professor Redish specifically criticizes settlement class actions 
for additional, independent reasons, arguing that they ―undermine[] both the 
formalistic dictates of Article III and the important constitutional values 
underlying the requirement of adversary adjudication.‖54  In such classes, 
the parties expressly make certification contingent on the entry of a settle-
ment resolving the litigation.  Thus, while settlement classes may have cer-
tain attractive aspects, such as reducing litigation expenses,55 many of the 
traditional aspects of adversarial litigation are missing.  As a result, accord-
ing to Professor Redish, the settlement class is potentially the product of 
collusion among the parties: defendants who wish to rid themselves of the 
burden of litigation and plaintiffs‘ counsel who wish to receive immediate 
compensation.  
Given that Article III expressly limits suits the federal courts may hear 
to ―cases‖ or ―controversies,‖ Professor Redish finds this characteristic of 
the settlement class constitutionally fatal:  
 
On the most basic analytical level, the unconstitutionality 
of the settlement class action should be obvious, purely as a 
matter of textual construction.  There is simply no rational 





  Id. (citing Memorandum of David F. Levi, Chair, Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, to the Civil Rules Advisory Committee, Perspectives on Rule 23 Including the Problem 
of Overlapping Classes 2-3 (Apr. 4, 2002)). 
52
  See id. at 169–73; see also id. at 175 (―In virtually no other context may constitutional rights be 
formally waived by such total passivity on the part of the rightholder when the rightholder has himself 
neither brought an action nor been made a defendant in an action.‖).  
53
  Id. at 170 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 
673 (1974)). 
54
  See id. at 19.  He further observes that settlement classes have been the subject of criticism on 
policy grounds: ―A number of respected courts and scholars . . . have sounded cautionary notes about the 
practice, suggesting that the settlement class action brings with it serious risks of collusion and unfair-
ness that ultimately disadvantage absent class members.‖  Id. at 177. 
55
  MANUAL, supra note 32, at § 21.612. 
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clude a proceeding in which, from the outset, nothing is 
disputed and the parties are in complete agreement.  More-
over, from both historical and doctrinal perspectives, Su-
preme Court decisions could not be more certain that 
Article III is satisfied only when the parties are truly ―ad-
verse‖ to one another, which, at the time the relevant pro-
ceeding is undertaken, they are not in the case of the 
settlement class action.56 
 
Accordingly, Professor Redish would abolish the practice on purely consti-
tutional grounds.   
In taking this position, he departs with other procedural scholars, who 
recognize some of the problems that may arise in settlement classes, but 
who do not go so far as to argue that they are constitutionally suspect.  As 
Professor Redish observes, ―[m]ost courts and commentators‖ have viewed 
the nonadversarial nature of the settlement class and the perverse incentives 
to which it gives rise as ―solely a sub-constitutional problem, looking at it 
through the lens of the Rule 23(a)(4) adequacy of representation require-
ment.‖57  Under Professor Redish‘s analysis, however, it is a more funda-
mental problem—one that cannot be remedied through additional reforms 





  REDISH, supra note 4, at 178 (footnotes omitted).  Professor Redish also argues that the settle-
ment class violates the constitutional separation of powers principle, given that courts go beyond the 
powers delegated to the judicial branch when they make determinations in the absence of a legitimate 
―case or controversy‖: 
The Constitution‘s system of separation of powers is . . . undermined by so-called settlement class 
actions, where the class action court is asked not to resolve a real dispute between a litigant class and a 
party opposing that class, but rather merely to approve and implement a prearranged legal arrangement 
between the parties that was reached prior to the seeking of class certification.  
Id. at 229. 
57
  Id. at 211. 
